Introduction
Suppose that the players in a dynamic game played over an event tree (DGPET) agree to cooperate and maximize their joint payoff over a given finite planning horizon. The question we ask in this paper is the following: can the resulting cooperative outcomes be sustained as an equilibrium?
In a DGPET, which is a particular stochastic game, the uncertainty is represented by an exogenously given finite event tree, that is, players do not influence the probabilities of transitions between nodes of the tree. As in multistage games (or difference games), a DGPET involves control and state variables. This class of games was initially introduced to examine equilibria in the European natural gas market by Zaccour, 1987 and Haurie et al., 1990 . The solution concept proposed in these papers was termed S -adapted equilibrium where S stands for sample of realizations of the stochastic process.
Recently, cooperation in DGPET was considered, with the aim of constructing node-consistent solutions, which means that at any node of the event tree, each player's cooperative payoff-to-go in the subgame starting at that node, dominates her noncooperative counterpart. Reddy et al., 2013 proposed a nodeconsistent Shapley value for this class of games, whereas Parilina and Zaccour, 2015a built a node-consistent core. Node consistency reduces to time consistency in deterministic multistage games, that is, games with an event tree having only one node at each period. The concept of time consistency was first introduced in Petrosjan, 1977 ; see also Petrosjan and Danilov, 1979 . In these references, one idea was to redistribute the players' payoffs along cooperative trajectory by applying an imputation distribution procedure (IDP), which is a decomposition over time of players' payoffs. Since then, a large literature followed on time consistency in dynamic (especially differential) games; see the book by Yeung and Petrosyan, 2006 and the survey by Zaccour, 2008 .
To be more precise on our objective here, assume that the players decide to select a particular imputation in the overall cooperative game, say the Shapley value to fix ideas, and next devise a node-consistent IDP. Now, replace for each player her original payoff in each node by its computed IDP gain. Can these modified payoffs be supported strategically, that is, they are part of a (Nash) equilibrium? If at any node there exists a player who benefits if she deviates from the cooperative trajectory, then it implies that the cooperative trajectory is not an equilibrium in the game with payoffs given by IDP. If not, then the conclusion is that the cooperative solution is an equilibrium, and hence is sustainable.
The problem of strategically supporting a cooperative solution is an old one in repeated games. We know from folk theorems that any individually rational outcome (including a cooperative outcome, which is our focus here) can be sustained if the players are sufficiently patient. A folk theorem about the existence of subgame perfect equilibrium in trigger strategies for stochastic games was proved by Dutta, 1995 . Recently, Parilina, 2014 provided a condition of strategic support of a cooperative solution in stochastic games. In state-space games, it seems that there is no general folk theorem, but many results for special cases exist. For early contributions in this area, see, e.g., Haurie and Tolwinski, 1985 , Tolwinski, 1986 , Haurie and Pohjola, 1987 and Haurie et al., 1994 , and for more recent ones, see, e.g., Petrosyan, 2008 and Chistyakov and Petrosyan, 2013. 1 Folk theorems are for infinite-horizon games. It is well-known that cooperation is very hard, if not impossible, to sustain in finite-horizon games. The reason is that players will find it optimal to deviate in the last stage and by a backward induction argument, the result is a noncooperative mode of play throughout the game. Different concepts have been proposed to cope with this difficulty, in particular the idea of subgameperfect ε-equilibrium; see, e.g., Radner, 1980 , Benoit and Krishna, 1985 , Solan and Vieille, 2003 , Mailath et al., 2005 , Flesch et al., 2014 and Flesh and Predtetchinski, 2015 . For the class of DGPET, Parilina and Zaccour, 2015b constructed an ε-equilibrium and provided some illustrative examples in environmental economics. This paper takes stock on Parilina and Zaccour, 2015b, but differ in one fundamental way: here, we use the same method for the case where the nodes' payoffs are given by the IDP. Put differently, we wish to check if a node-consistent IDP enjoys the property of being an equilibrium. The short answer is no, but it is in an ε-equilibrium sense.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the model of the game over event tree, and Section 3 deals with realization of the cooperative solution and problems arise with the realization. Section 4 contains main results. We provide an illustrative example in Section 5, and briefly conclude in Section 6.
Game over event tree
We briefly recall the main ingredients of the class of dynamic games played over event trees; see Haurie et al., 2012 for more details.
Let T = {0, 1, . . . , T } be the set of periods. The exogenous stochastic process is represented by an event tree, which has a root node n 0 in period 0 and a set of nodes N t = n t 1 , . . . , n t Nt in period t = 1, . . . , T . Each node n t l ∈ N t represents a possible sample value of the history of the stochastic process up to time t. The tree graph structure represents the nesting of information as one time period succeeds the other. Let a(n t l ) ∈ N t−1 be the unique predecessor of node n t l ∈ N t on the event-tree graph, t = 1, . . . , T , and S(n t l ) ⊂ N t+1 be the set of all possible direct successors of node n t l ∈ N t . A path from the root node n 0 to a terminal node n T l is called a scenario. Each scenario has a probability and the probabilities of all scenarios sum up to 1. We denote by π(n t l ) the probability of passing through node n t l , which corresponds to the sum of the probabilities of all scenarios that contain this node. In particular, π(n 0 ) = 1 and π(n T l ) is equal to the probability of the single scenario that terminates in node n T l . Denote the set of players by M = {1, . . . , m}. For each player j ∈ M , we define a set of controls indexed over the set of nodes. Denote by u j (n t l ) ∈ R mj the control of player j at node n t l , and let u(n
be the control set of player j. Denote by U 
u a n
At each node n t l , t = 0, . . . , T − 1, the reward to player j is a function of the state and the controls of all players, given by φ
We assume that player j ∈ M maximizes his expected stream of payoffs discounted at rate λ j (0 < λ j < 1). The state equations and the reward functions define the following multistage game, where we let
and J j (x, u) be the payoff to player j ∈ M that is,
s.t.
Definition 1 An admissible S-adapted strategy of player j is a vector
, that is, a plan of actions adapted to the history of the random process represented by the event tree.
The S -adapted strategy profile of the m players is u = (u j : j ∈ M ). We can thus define a game in normal
is a payoff function of player j ∈ M , and x is obtained from u as the unique solution of the state equations that emanate from the initial state x 0 .
If the game is played noncooperatively, then the players will seek a Nash equilibrium in S -adapted strategies defined as follows:
Definition 2 An S-adapted Nash equilibrium is an admissible S-adapted strategy profile u N such that for every player j ∈ M the following condition holds:
where (u
is the S-adapted strategy profile when all players i = j, i ∈ M , use their Nash equilibrium strategies.
Remark 1 Although the S-adapted and open-loop equilibria look similar, we note that they differ in the definitions of the state equations and controls. In an open-loop information structure, the controls and the state equations are defined over time. In an S-adapted information structure, the controls and the state equations are defined (indexed) over the set of nodes of the event tree.
If the players agree to cooperate, then they will maximize the sum of their discounted payoffs throughout the entire horizon, that is, max
Denote the resulting profile of cooperative controls by u * , that is,
Further, denote by x * = {x * (n
where
is an S -adapted strategy profile in the subgame,
} is an admissible S -adapted strategy of player j in the subgame starting at node n t l , with initial state x * (n t l ). The term π(n θ l |n t l ) is the conditional probability 2 that node n θ l will be realized if the subgame starts at node n t l . If the players act noncooperatively in the subgame starting at node n t l with state x * (n t l ) and find the S -adapted Nash equilibrium according to Definition 2, we denote it as u N (n
. If the players cooperate in the subgame starting at node n t l with the state x * (n t l ), they maximize the sum of their total discounted payoffs, i.e., max uj (n t l ):j∈M j∈M
The conditional probability π(n θ l |n t l ) can be calculated by the formula: π(n θ l |n t l ) = π(n θ l )/π(n t l ) if π(n t l ) = 0; otherwise, the subgame starting from node n t l cannot materialize.
and the cooperative controls in the subgame are given as follows:
Therefore, the payoff to player j in the cooperative subgame starting from node n Remark 2 We suppose that the joint-optimization solution and the Nash equilibrium in the whole game and in any subgame are unique. The uniqueness for the joint-optimization solution requires, as usual, strict concavity of the objective function and the control set must be compact and convex. For uniqueness of S-adapted Nash equilibrium, we observe that the multistage game has a normal form representation, and therefore the conditions for uniqueness are the same as in classical games with continuous payoffs with constraints as established in Rosen [1965] .
Cooperative solution
Suppose that the players decide to cooperate and agree on a particular imputation y(n 0 ) = (y 1 (n 0 ), . . ., y m (n 0 )) as a solution to whole cooperative game. By being an imputation, y(n 0 ) satisfies the following equality:
Unless the game is trivial, the total before-side-payment payoff W j (u * , x 0 ) of player j ∈ M , does not coincide with her total after-side-payment payoff given by y j (n 0 ). Further, we need to keep in mind that depending on how y j (n 0 ) is decomposed over nodes, the player may have more or less interest in continuing cooperation. Now, we proceed with some details.
First, define the characteristic function V (G; n t l ) : 2 m → R, where G is a coalition of players (G ⊂ M ), and V (∅; n t l ) = 0. To compute the value V (G; n t l ) for any coalition G ⊂ M and any node n t l ∈ N t , we adopt the γ-characteristic function assumption, which states that when coalition G forms, the left-out-players (N \G) would not join force against G, but only use their individually best-reply strategies. Consequently, the value of γ-characteristic function for coalition G is given by the S -adapted equilibrium outcome of G in the non-cooperative game between members of G maximizing their joint payoff, and non members playing individually, i.e., maximizing their individual payoffs.
Second, we define the imputation set Y (n t l ) in any subgame starting at node n t l in state x * (n t l ), that is,
Definition 3
We call ({β j (n t l )} n t l ∈N t ,t=0,...,T : j ∈ M ) an imputation distribution procedure (IDP) of the imputation y(n 0 ) = (y 1 (n 0 ), . . . , y m (n 0 )), where β j (n t l ) is a payment to player j at node n t l in state x * (n t l ), if for all j ∈ M the following conditions hold:
Equation (8) means that the expected sum of the discounted payments to player j ∈ M is equal to her imputation in the whole game. Equations (9), (10) are the conditions for "admissibility" of IDP, i.e., the sum of payments to the players in any node is equal to the sum of payoffs that they can obtain at this node using cooperative controls u * (n t l ). We should notice that only along the cooperative trajectory that players receive payments according to IDP. Off this trajectory, they are paid according to their payoff functions φ n t l j (·) and Φ n t l j (·).
Definition 4
The imputation y(n 0 ) ∈ C(n 0 ) ⊂ Y (n 0 ) and corresponding imputation distribution procedure
are called node consistent in the whole game, if for any state x * (n t l ), n t l ∈ N t , t = 0, . . . , T , there exists
) satisfying the following condition:
Here C(n t l ) is a cooperative solution of the cooperative subgame beginning at node n t l with state x * (n t l ) and it is a subset of the imputation set Y (n t l ). E.g., it may be the core, the nucleolus, the Shapley value or any other subset.
Any IDP satisfying the conditions in (8)- (10) is admissible. Following Parilina and Zaccour, 2015a, we propose the following node-consistent IDP:
and for t = T :
where y(n t l ) = (y 1 (n t l ), . . . , y m (n t l )) ∈ C(n t l ) for any n t l ∈ N t , t = 0, . . . , T − 1. To compute the IDP, the players need to choose an imputation y(n t l ) belonging to the same cooperative solution 3 in any subgame starting at node n t l in state x * (n t l ), and follow equations (12) and (13) . If the cooperative solution C(·) is a singleton like the Shapley value, the IDP is uniquely defined by equations (12) and (13), in which y j (n t l ) is the jth component of the Shapley value calculated for the subgame beginning at node n t l with state x * (n t l ).
Remark 3 Considering the cooperative subgame beginning from node n t l , we determine the characteristic function V (G; n t l ) , which is a function of the state x * (n t l ) as well as the node. To make the notations simpler, we omit the state. Therefore, V (G; n t l ) should be read as V (G; n t l , x * (n t l )) . We also omit the state in the notations of the imputation y(n t l ) and IDP β (n t l ), which should be read as y(n t l , x * (n t l )) and β (n t l , x * (n t l )), respectively.
Strategic support of cooperative solution
To recapitulate, in the previous section we stated that if the players agree to cooperate throughout the game, we can implement the agreed upon imputation by changing the initial payoff of player j in node n t l , that is, φ
T . Once this done, the objective is to show that these (new) outcomes can be supported strategically, that is, they correspond to the subgame perfect ε-equilibrium outcomes of a noncooperative DGPET.
We represent the DGPET in extensive form and assume that the players use closed-loop information structure when choosing their strategies. It means that each player knows not only the current node n t l ∈ N t , t = 0, . . . , T and what she has played on the path leading from the initial node n 0 to a(n t l ), but also what the other players did in all previous periods. Denote by P (n t l ) = (n 0 , n 1 i1 , . . . , n t−1 it−1 , n t l ) the unique path from initial node n 0 until n t l . We call the history of node n t l the collection of nodes and corresponding strategy profiles realized on the path P (n t l ) excepting node n t l , that is,
Definition 5 A behavior strategy of player j ∈ M in the DGPET is a function associating an action u(n t l ) with each history H(n t l ) for each node n t l ∈ N t , t = 0, . . . , T − 1, i.e.,
Behavior strategy σ j prescribes to player j the action that should be implemented in each node n t l of the event tree Γ(n 0 ). Denote by Σ j the set of behavior strategies of player j, by σ = (σ 1 , . . . , σ m ) a behavior strategy profile, and by Σ = Σ 1 × . . . × Σ m the set of possible strategy profiles. For a given behavior strategy profile, we can compute the expected payoff in all subgames, including the whole game, for any given initial state. Denote the payoff of player j in the subgame starting at node n t l in state x(n t l ) as a function of the behavior strategy profile, byŴ
where u(n t l ) is a trajectory of controls in the subgame starting at node n t l with the state x(n t l ) corresponding to the profile σ.
Below we describe the trigger strategy for the DGPET in detail.
Definition 6 A strategy profile in behavior strategiesσ is subgame perfect ε-equilibrium if for any player j ∈ M , any node n t l ∈ N t , any strategy σ j ∈ Σ j and any history H(n t l ) the following inequality holdŝ
is the player j's payoff in the subgame starting at node n t l with the state x(n t l ) when players use strategy profileσ and the history of node n t l is H(n t l ).
To strategically support cooperation in the finite-horizon dynamic game played over an event tree, we shall construct an approximated equilibrium in behavior strategies with a closed-loop information structure. We make the following assumptions about players' behavior:
1. The players want to realize the cooperative trajectory u * from (6);
2. The players agree to implement the imputation y(x 0 ) along the cooperative trajectory u * ;
3. The players adopt the IDP payments as defined by (12) and (13); 4. If a player j deviates from cooperation at node a (n t l ) , that is, implementing a control u j (a (n t l )) = u * j (a (n t l )), then cooperation breaks down and all players switch to their Nash equilibrium strategies in the subgame starting at node n t l in state x (n
If player p ∈ M deviates and cooperation breaks down, her payoff in the subgame starting at n
, that is, the profit that player p achieves when all players implement Nash equilibrium strategies. Denote byσ = (σ p : p ∈ M ) a behavior strategy profile that prescribes to player p = j to implement the cooperative control u * p (n The nominal mode. If the history of node n t l coincides with
i.e., all players used their cooperative controls on the path P n
The trigger mode. If the history of node n t l is such that there exists a node n on the path P n t−1 it−1 such that u(n) = u * (n), then player p's strategy is Nash equilibrium strategy calculated for the subgame starting from the successor of n and corresponding state. Here, the history of node n t l is such that there exists a node n and at least one deviating player j ∈ M , j = p, that is, the history H(n) of node n is part of H * (n t l ), and (n, u(n)) is not part of H * (n t l ), but if we replace the control u j (n) of player j in node n by the cooperative control u * j (n), then the pair (n, (u −j (n), u * j (n))) will be (n, u * (n)) and part of history H * (n t l ).
Formally speaking, the trigger behavior strategy of player p ∈ M is defined as follows:
whereû p (n t l ) is player p's control in node n t l . The controlû p (n t l ) implements the punishing strategy in the subgame starting in the unique node belonging to the set S(n) ∩ P (n t l ). The controlû p (n t l ) coincides with u N p (n t l ) calculated as a part of Nash equilibrium for the subgame starting at node n 1 = S(n) ∩ P (n t l ) in state x(n 1 ).
To avoid further complicating the notation, we omitted the state argument in the punishing control and the trigger strategy, but we stress that they depend on the state value. Let node n 1 be a direct successor of node n in which player j deviates. The collection of controls (u * −j (n), u j (n)) is then realized, and the state value in node n 1 can be calculated using the state dynamics
is a control of player p in node n 1 . Now, in the subgame starting from node n t l ∈ N t in state x(n t l ), the collection of controls punishing player j's individual deviation is given byû j (n
) . This collection of controls generates Nash equilibrium trajectory of states in player j's punishment in this subgame, that is,
To construct the trigger strategies, we need to find m punishing strategy profiles for each subgame. Our main result follows.
Theorem 1 Consider the game played over event tree when players' payoffs on the cooperative trajectory are determined by node-consistent IDP with equations (12) and (13) . For any ε ε in the game there exists subgame perfect ε-equilibrium in trigger strategies with players' payoffs y 1 (n 0 ), . . ., y m (n 0 ), and ε = max The total costs of the three players in the whole game are 2148.7. Tables 1 and 2 show the advantage of adopting the IDP in this game. When players adopt the IDP the maximal benefit of a deviating player or ε is equal to 67.5529 in comparison with 108.902 in the game without using IDP for payoff redistribution. Further, the first time when a player can benefit from deviating is in period t = 2 while in the game without IDP the profitable deviation is observed in period t = 0. Players 1 and 2 have lower benefits from deviations in the game with IDP than in the game without IDP. But player 3 will have higher incentive to deviate from cooperative trajectory if players adopt the IDP.
Concluding remarks
Node consistency, and node consistency for DGPET, can be seen as a necessary condition for sustainability of cooperation, but not a sufficient condition. The reason is that time consistency is not an equilibrium, and consequently the resulting outcomes are not self enforced.
The objective of this paper was to show that node-consistent outcomes are part of a subgame perfect ε-equilibrium. As mentioned earlier, as there is no hope for endowing the cooperative outcomes with an equilibrium property, an approximation was sought here. The simple numerical example showed that deviations can be large and occur in early periods. One conjecture here is that the larger the planning horizon, the later
